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ABSTRACT. 
A discrete-time discrete-value pseudo-chaotic encoder/decoder system is presented. The 
pseudo-chaotic module is a 3D discrete version of the well-known Lorenz dynamical system. 
Scaling and biasing transformations as well as natural number arithmetics are employed in 
order to simplify realizations on a small size Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The 
encryption ability is improved by using only the least significant byte of one of the pseudo 
chaotic state variables as the key to encrypt the plain text. The key is periodically perturbed 
by another chaotic state variable. The statistical properties of the pseudo chaotic cipher are 
compared with those of other pseudo-random generators available in the literature. As an 
example of applicability of the technique, a full duplex communication system is designed 
and constructed using FPGA as technological framework.  
 
 
 
Index Terms – chaotic communication, encryption, ciphers, FPGA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last years the use of chaos in communications has become a very important 
topic of research. Both analog and digital schemes have been proposed [1-7]. For a complete 
review on the state of the art, see [8-12]. 
Chaotic digital communications schemes may be coarse classified in one of two categories: 
1) chaotic modulation techniques and 2) chaotic encryption techniques. In the first class, a 
continuous chaotic signal is modulated by the information and the emerging compound signal 
is digitized and transmitted through the communication channel. In the case of chaotic 
encryption techniques, a sequence generated by a discrete or continuous chaotic system is 
used as a key for ciphering a plain text.  
Chaotic masking, switching, parameter modulation and frequency hopping sequences as 
well as symbolic representation of controlled chaotic orbits, are some of the methods 
proposed in the literature to send binary messages. 
The level of security of analog and digital chaotic communication systems is an issue under 
discussion. Several unmasking procedures and also new realizations with enhanced security 
have recently appeared [13-22]. 
This paper contributes to the above lines by presenting a discrete-time discrete-value 
pseudo-chaotic cipher that employs one of the state variables of a Lorenz 3D-map. The main 
differences with previous schemes are: a) instead of a 1D map, a 3D map is used as key 
sequence generator; b) only the least significant byte of the pseudo-chaotic state variable is 
used in the encryption process. In addition, it is periodically perturbed by another pseudo-
chaotic state variable of the own system, in order to improve the statistical properties; c) 
instead of floating point numbers (required by continuous-value ciphers), natural numbers are 
used here to simplify the hardware realization. As the system is asynchronous the Byte Error 
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Ratio (BER) present a high sensitivity respect to any minimal mismatch between receiver and 
transmitter. The use of natural number arithmetics simplifies this strict matching requirement; 
d) The full duplex communications system may be realized on 54K equivalent gate FPGA. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: in section II, the chaotic encoder is presented 
and its statistical properties are analyzed; in section III, a complete communication system is 
prototyped using FPGA. Area-time figure of the sistem is evaluated in section IV. 
II. THE LORENZ 3D MAP: STATISTICAL PERFORMANCE AND REALIZATION 
The Lorenz chaotic attractor is generated by the following continuous dynamical system: 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
where δ, Γ and b are control parameters.  
This continuous system may be converted into a 3D-map by means of the Euler´s first order 
approach, as follows: 
 
(2) 
 
where k is a time scaling parameter. In order to reduce the hardware complexity the following 
biasing and scaling transformations are applied: 
 
(3) 
 
where B and S are respectively the biasing and scaling parameters. The resulting equations 
are: 
 
512;40;2;24;8;64/1 ====Γ=δ= SBbk
(4) 
 
 
 
In this paper, the following values are adopted: 
(5) 
Thus, the final equations are: 
 
(6) 
 
 
 
The map (6) is structurally stable. The operations involved are additions, subtractions, 
divisions by powers of two, and finally only two products.  
Fig. 1 is a 3D-view of a trajectory of map (6) starting at X0=18503, Y0=21315 and 
Z0=32032. The typical butterfly shape of the Lorenz attractor clearly emerges from this 
figure. The range of the state variables in Fig. 1 implies that at least 17 digits are required. 
The most significant bits of the state variables carry low frequency information concerning 
the Lorenz attractor, as will be shown below. To make the encryption process stronger, these 
bits must not be send through the channel.  
It is important to note that the map (6) is not truly chaotic because the number of digits is 
finite, and the binary divisions produce a truncation effect. However, by increasing the scale  
factor S, it is possible to increase the period of the generated sequence because the truncation  
effect diminishes. Numerical experiments give up 78,782 as the highest attainable value. This 
period would be not high enough for specific applications. The use of small pseudo-chaotic 
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perturbations increases this value to 6,500,000, if the perturbation is applied each 10,000 
clock cycles. 
Fig. 2 shows the block diagram of the 3D-map generator. The least significant byte of Xn is 
the pseudo-chaotic key, key[7..0] used to encrypt the plain text. It is perturbed each N clock 
cycle, performing a XOR operation with the least significant byte of Yn , producing the signal 
X’n[7..0]. The highest bits of X’n, it means X’n[16..8] are identical to Xn[16..8]. X’n[16..0] is 
reinjected in the dynamical system.  
The cipher generated by the Lorenz 3D-map of Fig. 2 was tested using five standard 
statistical benchmarks. Table I shows a comparison between the technique presented in this 
paper and those obtained for three pseudo-random sequence generators reported in the 
literature [23, 24]. We took five samples for each generator. Table I shows that the Lorenz 
3D-map passes all tests  
Using this approach, the communication system of Fig. 3 has been designed as a case-
study. Fig. 3a shows the block diagram of the transmitter. The plain text is the one byte length 
binary sequence labeled plain_text[7..0]; it means that 256 levels are used to obtain it by  
a digital conversion of the message. In the transmitter, the key[7..0] is mixed by means of a 
XOR operation with each byte of the plain text. The output of the XOR, labeled, 
ciper_text[7..0], leaves the transmitter after a parallel-serial conversion. It travels through the 
communication channel and enters into the receiver (see Fig. 3b). In the receiver a similar 
Lorenz 3D-map, starting from identical initial conditions, is used to reverse the process. The 
signal rec_text[7..0] is the recovered plain text. 
III. FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FULL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
The Lorenz 3D-map was implemented on the Altera EPF10K20TC144-3 FPGA sample, 
using the standard Max Plus II designing tool. An amount of 676 Logic Cells (LC’s) are 
required (i.e. less than the 58% of the logical resources available). The dynamics of the 3D-
map is determined by the initial conditions (Xin[16..0], Yin[16..0], Zin[16..0]), and the 
repetition rate of the chaotic perturbation (N[13..0]). 
The full transmitter (Fig. 3a) requires 13,800 gates and the full receiver (Fig 3b) 13,200 
gates: that is, the 69% and 66% of one chip resources respectively  
Figs. 4a and 4b show the timing diagram in the case of a plain text consisting of a repetitive 
sequence of the numbers 0 to 255 (see also Fig. 3). The transmitter and receiver clocks, that 
control the overall encryption/decryption process, run at 6.25 MHz and 25 MHz respectively. 
The transmission rate is 568.2Kbytes/s. As can be seen the recovered text , rec_text[7..0], is 
identical to the plain_text[7..0].  
IV. EVALUATION OF THE FULL SYSTEM 
 
Several tools were utilized to evaluate the statistical properties of the encrypted signal. 
Figs. 5a and 5b evidence that the first and second order distributions of the encrypted signal, 
cipher_text[7...0], are remarkably uniform. The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), (see Fig. 6a) 
looks like white noise. The inclusion of the most significant bits of Xn reinforces the low 
frequency spectrum as is depicted in Fig. 6b. Fig. 7 has four panels showing the importance of 
discarding the 9 most significant bits of Xn , and the effect of the chaotic perturbation 
generated by the XOR gate in the block diagram of Fig. 2. These four panels show the 
autocovariance of the ciphered text Cn in the following cases: in 7a (corresponding to the 
block diagram of Fig. 2) the key consists of only the 8 least significant bits of Xn and the 
chaotic perturbation is “on”. In (7b), the key consists of only the 8 least significant bits of Xn 
but the chaotic perturbation is “off”. In the third panel (7c) the key is Xn[16..0] and the 
chaotic perturbation is “on”. Finally in the fourth panel (7d) the key is Xn[16..0] and the 
chaotic perturbation is “off”. These pictures indicate that the best choice is (a), i.e. the 
realization proposed in this paper.  
In the case of an ideal channel considered here, the Bit Error Ratio (BER) must be 0 for 
identical Lorenz Generators at both ends and it must increase if synchronization is lost. In Fig. 
8a the case when parameters are not identical is considered (parameter mismatching). The 
picture shows the BER as a function of the percentage of parameter mismatch between 
transmitter and receiver. In Fig. 8b the case of initial condition mismatching. It is clear that 
the system is very sensitive to parameter or initial condition mismatchings. Even the smallest 
possible didfference (the least significant bit) between one parameter or initial contition in the 
receiver, with the corresponding parameter or initial condition in the transmitter, leads to a 
complete desynchronization, and the BER grows up to its maximal value 0.5. It means that 
only a matched receiver can recover the plain text. Let us stress that the perfect matching is 
attainable in this digital system employing natural numbers. This is an important advantage 
over analog chaotic communication systems based on identical synchronization.  
V CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, a digital communication system, using a pseudo-chaotic attractor as 
encrypting key, is presented. Natural number arithmetics has been employed in order to 
simplify the realization on 54K equivalent gate FPGA. Additionally, it makes straightforward 
the matching process between transmitter and receiver. A simple perturbation procedure used 
to increase the period of the pseudo-chaotic key, is proposed. The perturbation is generated by 
another pseudo chaotic variable of the same dynamical system. The statistical tests of the key, 
and the FFT and autocovariance of the ciphered text, comfirm that the encryption ability is 
enhanced by using the key proposed here: the least significant byte of the state variable, 
periodically perturbed by another pseudo-chaotic state variable. The high sensitivity of the 
BER to any minimal difference between transmitter and receiver, assures that only a matched 
receiver can decode the message. The functional and timing simulations and the compilation 
and fitting resources, show that the full duplex system may be implemented on four small 
FPGA.  
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Fig. 1.  3D-view of the trajectory of the Lorenz 3D-map of eq. (6) starting at X0=18503, Y0=21315 and 
Z0=32032.  
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the dynamical system generating the 3D-map of eq. (6) 
 Fig. 3. (a) Block diagram of the transmitter; (b) Block diagram of the receiver 
Fig. 4. Timing simulation performed with Max Plus II on the EPF10K20TC144-3 IC. (a) main signals involved 
in the transmitter (see also Fig. 3a); (b) main signals in the receiver (see also Fig. 3b). 
Fig. 5. Trajectory plots for Cn=out_rx in the case of a plain text consisting in a periodic sequence of the numbers 
0 to 255. (a) 2D trajectory plot for Cn=out_rx; (b) 3D trajectory plot for Cn=out_rx. 
Fig. 6. Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of the ciphered text Cn. The plain text is a periodic sequence of the 
numbers 0 to 255. The FFT is evaluated over 100,000 samples.  (a) only the least significant byte of Xn are used 
in the encryption process. (b) all the 17 bits of Xn are used in the encryption process. 
Fig. 7. Autocovariance of the ciphered text Cn evaluated over 1,000,000 samples: (a) only the least significant 
byte of Xn is used in the encryption process and perturbation is on; (b) only the least significant byte of Xn is 
used in the encryption process and perturbation is off; (c) all the 17 bits of Xn are used in the encryption process 
and perturbation is on; (d) all the 17 bits of Xn are used in the encryption process and perturbation is off. 
Fig. 8. Relationship between BER and percentage of receiver mismatches. (a) BER versus parameter 
p=(kB2S+kbBS) of equation 4. (b) BER versus a mismatch in the initial condition X0  
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Fig. 8. Relationship between BER and percentage of receiver mismatches. (a) BER versus parameter 
p=(kB2S+kbBS) of equation 4. (b) BER versus a mismatch in the initial condition x0 
 
 
Table I 
Comparison between different pseudo random generators using standard tests[23, 24]. The column labeled 
Lorenz correspond to the cipher presented in this paper. The other columns correspond to other pseudo random 
generators available in the literature. Each generator is tested five times. A shaded value indicates that the test 
has failed 
 
 
Generator  
Test 
Lorenz LFSR Lehmer Marsaglia 
Frequency  
n = 400,000, 
α = 0.05, ν = 1 
If X < 3.842 
=> accept Ho 
1.875 
0.031 
0.161 
0.038 
1.823 
1.170 
2.134 
1.513 
0.005 
0.188 
0.313 
0.083 
0.015 
3.576 
0.520 
1.239 
2.510 
0.062 
0.013 
1.399 
Serial 
n = 400,000, 
α = 0.05, ν = 2 
If X < 5.992 
=> accept Ho 
1.960 
0.329 
1.546 
1.157 
3.533 
4.721 
2.136 
2.821 
0.158 
2.242 
0.643 
0.860 
2.882 
3.658 
1.490 
1.35 
2.512 
0.137 
2.468 
1.427 
Poker 
n = 400,000, (*) 
α =0.05, ν= 255 
If X < 293.248 
=> accept Ho 
242.836 
255.483 
234.931 
208.942 
291.538 
280.735 
336.379 
228.910 
219.387  
237.194 
245.581 
232.586 
273.690 
282.209 
259.323 
277.140 
228.357 
229.903 
251.233 
261.402 
Runs 
n = 400,000, 
α = 0.05, ν = 26 
If X < 38.885 
=> accept Ho 
33.808 
26.631 
19.686 
35.118 
25.467 
68.345 
52.351 
52.528 
35.207 
71.248 
31.890 
33.578 
26.042 
21.584 
27.997 
20.144 
28.897 
18.645 
37.228 
24.702 
Autocorrelation 
n = 400,000, 
α = 0.05 
If |X| < 1.645 
=> accept Ho 
-0.293 
-0.545 
1.178 
-1.058 
1.304 
1.886 
0.043 
1.140 
0.391 
-1.434 
0.577 
0.881 
-1.693 
-0.286 
0.985 
0.340 
0.049 
-0.270 
1.567 
0.169 
 (*) The sequence with length n (400,000) is split into k (50,000) non-overlapping parts each of length m (8). 
 
 
